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Research on factors influencing the process of European Union (EU) legis-
lative decision-making has made enormous progress in recent years. After an
early study by Krislov et al. (1986) providing descriptive statistics on 472 EU
decisions made between 1958 and 1981, Heiner Schulz and I introduced a
theoretical model to derive hypotheses on institutional and preference-related
factors influencing decision-making speed, i.e. on the application of qualified
majority voting in the Council, on the participation of the European Parlia-
ment as an additional veto player, on the relevance of EU core policy areas
as well as on the type of applied policy instrument (König and Schulz, 1997;
Schulz and König, 2000). Using a data set on 5183 Commission proposals,
which were processed in the period between 1984 and 1995, we tested these
factors by applying both parametric and non-parametric event history
analysis. We also rejected the use of Cox regression because the ‘coefficients
of the interaction variables were different from zero and highly significant,
indicating a clear violation of the proportionality assumption’ (Schulz and
König, 2000: 662). We therefore presented our results of parametric log logistic
analyses, plotting Q versus Log t to check the (linear) relationship, and found
that institutional reform may have a substantial impact on decision-making
efficiency.
Our study motivated and influenced Golub’s research (1999, 2002, 2007).
Using 1141 directives, he also began studying the decision-making process,
defined as the time lag between the Commission’s formal proposal and final
adoption of the legislative act. He investigated, in a similar way to Schulz
and me, how a diverse set of factors influences this process; i.e. Council quali-
fied majority voting (QMV) and parliamentary participation unsurprisingly
remain the significant effects (Golub, 1999: 750). Golub (1999: 733) concluded
that the ‘impact of the Luxembourg Compromise has been greatly over-
estimated, that institutional reforms actually encumbered rather than eased
the EC legislative process’. Using a Cox regression in 2002, Golub re-analysed
his initial study with a slightly larger sample of 1669 directives and reports
to confirm previous findings, even though the effects of three variables
changed their direction. Most recently, Golub (2007) repeated this analysis on
the 1669 directives, now agreeing with our original conclusion that there is a
‘trade-off between efficiency and democratic inclusiveness’. The latest version
by Golub and Steunenberg (2007) re-analyses these results and contradicts
the previous findings on QMV after the Single European Act (SEA), QMV
post Maastricht, co-decision and cooperation after Maastricht, and the
Thatcher and backlog effects. Independently of this confusion, the conclusions
on enlargement and Thatcher effects remain speculative, as the following
analysis will show, owing to the lack of estimators for preferences.
In spite of some similarities in research design, Golub (2007: 156) attracts
attention by sharply criticizing previous studies on the EU decision-making
process as ‘fundamentally suspect’. In 1999, Golub still acknowledged that
‘the most sophisticated analysis to date of EC decision making comes from
unpublished work by Thomas König and Heiner Schulz’, but contended that,
‘because the authors do not examine decision making prior to 1984, they are
in no position to draw the types of comparative conclusions necessary to
assess the impact of institutional reform’ (Golub, 1999: 737; see also Golub,
2007: 161). This is very surprising because the intensely discussed reforms in
Golub’s analyses refer to the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty, which date from
1987 and 1993 respectively, and are thus clearly included in the period of our
studies. On the other hand, Golub’s widely discussed Luxembourg Compro-
mise occurred in 1966, two years before his longest study begins. But Golub
(1999: 737) continued his sharp criticism by stating that ‘König and Schulz
also lump together decisions, regulations, and directives at various points in
their analysis’. My analysis will briefly show that it is better to control for
different types of instrument than to assume that any specific type is both
better suited for and more representative of the greater body of EU legislation
in the analysis of the decision-making process.
More generally, my response attempts to settle some disagreements on
scientific grounds by seriously assessing Golub’s central and repeated
presumptions and thereby concentrates on three aspects: the research design
in terms of sample selection and period under study; the theoretical draw-
backs in terms of the explanatory variables used; and the statistical method
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applied, in particular the superiority of a Cox regression with inclusion of
time-dependent variables. The results will reveal that Golub’s claims are
plainly incorrect. With regard to sample selection, the reader will see that the
statement that only directives contain ‘important, complex and controversial
issues rather than merely operational decisions and administrative matters’
is simply wrong (Golub, 2007: 166). Secondly, it will become apparent that a
repeated econometric analysis and speculation about the nature of control
variables, such as historical time or the Thatcher effect, can hardly advance
the state of the discipline. Golub’s major variable for the hypothesized effects
of institutional reforms, enlargement rounds and Thatcher’s government is
implicitly based on member state preferences, but he fails to construct them
explicitly over the years. Instead of concentrating on statistical error when
using time-dependent variables, it is more advisable to provide a theoretical
foundation (Zorn, 2007: 573). I will exemplify this by showing that the UK
position does not reveal the ‘Fontainebleau effect’ suggested by Golub and
Steunenberg (2007), and the inclusion of member state preferences may
explain the curious findings on the effects of institutional variables, which
change over time.
The Sample: Directives or all binding instruments
In spite of Golub’s general criticism of previous work, a major advantage in
this field is the similarity of the research design used by the different authors.
All of us commonly use Commission proposals as the unit of analysis and
address factors that influence decision-making. For the reader, this similarity
facilitates a comparative evaluation of each study’s contribution to the state
of the discipline and helps in following the discussion. Regarding the unit of
analysis, these studies commonly identify formal legislative acts and use the
dates of the Commission’s formal initiative and of adoption as the central
indicators for the investigated process – in other words, the time lag between
initiation and adoption. However, a relatively large number of initiatives
remain pending because the EU’s legislative process is not limited by legis-
lative terms or dissolution (see König, 2007a).1 Despite these similarities, the
study designs differ in two important ways: our work includes the whole
body of binding secondary EU legislation with directives, regulations and
decisions since 1984, whereas Golub focuses only on Community directives
and on the periods of the investigated time since 1974 and 1968, respectively.
At first glance, the longer period of study seems to support Golub’s claim
(2007: 161) that neither ‘Schulz and König (2000) nor König (2007b) have
anything to say about many issues that Golub addresses: EU enlargement,
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the Luxembourg Compromise, the effects of institutional changes made by
the SEA and Maastricht, formal rules versus informal norms, the effects of
legislative backlog or the presence of extremist governments such as that of
Thatcher’. During Golub’s period of study, the Union experienced several
enlargement rounds and treaty changes, but the Luxembourg Compromise
in 1966, the Amsterdam (1999) and Nice (2003) treaties as well as Eastern
enlargement (2004) remain outside the scope of his analyses. From Figure 1,
it is easy to see that Golub’s criticism is mistaken, because our original studies
also cover the time before the Southern enlargement, SEA and Maastricht
(1984 to 1994), and König (2007b) additionally includes the Northern enlarge-
ment in 1995, allowing us to control for the effect of institutional reforms and
enlargement rounds. Note that these variables use dummies only to control
for historical time in which several of these events took place. Whether these
events, other events during these periods or other confounding variables
influenced the decision-making process still remains an open question.
A second major difference between these studies concerns the type of
legislative instruments examined. Although Golub analyses only directives,
the titles of his publications make more general reference to EU decision-
making. Golub (2007: 166) attempts to justify this generalization by stating
that, ‘[t]o me, explaining variation in the adoption rate for the most signifi-
cant and contentious laws constitutes a much more important task’. Our
analyses include all binding secondary legislative instruments of the EU,
European Union Politics 9(1)1 4 8
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Figure 1 Study design of Golub (1999, 2002, 2007), König (2007b), König and Schulz
(1997) and Schulz and König (2000).
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namely regulations, directives and decisions, and this comprehensive sample
allows us explicitly to control for the type of legislative instrument used rather
than forcing us to make heroic assumptions about their controversial nature.
In this sense, it is also easy to check Golub’s justification by using his own
data source, the PreLex database, which documents the entry of Commission
proposals as either A- or B-items on the Council agenda. This distinction
provides a clear indicator for whether a Commission proposal raised
controversy among member states: ‘In practice, A-items are approved en bloc
without prejudice to the provisions on the public nature of proceedings’
(European Commission, 2005: 127). The B-items, on the other hand, indicate
politically important decisions subject to continued discussion, even if general
agreement among the member states is reached in advance.
A quick inspection of Tables 1(a) and 1(b) rejects Golub’s second major
claim. In absolute numbers, 1266 of the 8475 cases are classified as B-items in
the period between 1 January 1984 and 1 February 2003. Even if we control for
different periods, regulations raise far more controversies among member
states, i.e. 133 regulations versus 20 directives between 1984 and 1986 (before
the Southern enlargement), 362 regulations versus 129 directives between the
coming into force of the SEA in 1987 and the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, and
159 regulations versus 22 directives after the Northern enlargement in 1995
until the coming into force of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999. Even relatively
speaking, about 17% of all regulations and directives before 1986, about 16%
of regulations and 27% of directives between 1987 and 1993, and about 17% of
regulations and 10% of directives between 1995 and 1999 do not provide
evidence for the purportedly more controversial nature of directives. Unsur-
prisingly, only decisions are fewer in number and notably less controversial.
Tables 1(a) and 1(b) also point to a major shortcoming in analyses that
use only directives for the study of the legislative process. Although the
relative number of controversies remains almost stable over time, the absolute
number of proposals and conflicts varies greatly across policy areas. These
area-specific effects are lacking in Golub’s studies, and the numbers for the
agricultural sector reveal that most Commission initiatives come in the form
of regulations and that almost half of all controversies are in this policy area.
This is perhaps less surprising for those scholars familiar with the EU budget,
from which about half is allocated to this area. Similarly, the fisheries sector
shows a high potential for conflict, whereas the areas of trade and of customs
union produce many initiatives but few conflicts. Directives obviously fail to
account for this central aspect of EU legislative decision-making: some
important sectors, such as fisheries, budget and trade (except for a single
case), are not even regulated with directives. Others, such as industry or trans-
port, have relied on directives in some periods, and opted exclusively for
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European Union Politics 9(1)1 5 0
Ta
b
le
 1
(a
)
P
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
o
f 
C
o
u
n
ci
l c
o
n
tr
o
ve
rs
ie
s 
b
y 
in
st
ru
m
en
t,
 p
o
lic
y 
ar
ea
 a
n
d
 p
er
io
d
, 1
98
4–
19
93
Pe
ri
od
1/
1/
19
84
 –
 3
1/
12
/1
98
6
1/
1/
19
86
 –
 3
0/
6/
19
87
1/
7/
19
87
 –
 3
1/
10
/1
99
3
Le
ng
th
 o
f p
er
io
d
36
 m
on
th
s
18
 m
on
th
s
76
 m
on
th
s
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
In
st
ru
m
en
t
D
ec
is
io
n
R
eg
ul
at
io
n
D
ir
ec
tiv
e
D
ec
is
io
n
R
eg
ul
at
io
n
D
ir
ec
tiv
e
D
ec
is
io
n
R
eg
ul
at
io
n
D
ir
ec
tiv
e
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
C
ou
nc
il 
di
sc
us
si
on
 it
em
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
D
G
01
 T
ra
d
e
12
.4
–
9.
3
0.
7
0.
8
–
24
.6
1.
6
8.
4
0.
8
–
–
21
.2
1.
7
12
.4
0.
6
0.
2
–
D
G
01
A
 E
xt
er
n
al
 R
el
at
io
n
s 
E
u
ro
p
e
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
0.
6
–
0.
0
–
–
–
D
G
01
B
 E
xt
er
n
al
 R
el
at
io
n
s 
M
id
d
le
 E
as
t
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
0.
1
–
0.
0
–
–
–
D
G
02
 E
co
n
o
m
ic
, F
in
an
ci
al
 A
ff
ai
rs
2.
2
–
0.
3
–
–
–
1.
6
–
–
–
1.
2
–
2.
9
0.
7
0.
0
0.
0
0.
6
–
D
G
03
 In
d
u
st
ry
1.
1
0.
6
0.
4
0.
3
21
.0
2.
5
0.
8
–
0.
2
–
18
.8
14
.1
2.
9
–
0.
9
0.
3
18
.4
7.
4
D
G
04
 C
o
m
p
et
it
io
n
0.
6
–
0.
1
–
0.
8
–
–
–
–
–
–
1.
2
–
–
0.
3
0.
0
0.
4
–
D
G
05
 E
m
p
lo
ym
en
t,
 S
o
ci
al
 A
ff
ai
rs
3.
4
0.
6
0.
7
–
0.
8
1.
7
2.
4
0.
8
0.
8
–
–
1.
2
1.
6
0.
9
0.
5
0.
2
4.
7
2.
5
D
G
06
 A
g
ri
cu
lt
u
re
21
.3
5.
1
30
.2
13
.2
15
.1
10
.1
15
.9
0.
8
45
.7
3.
4
16
.5
7.
1
14
.2
2.
4
31
.4
9.
6
17
.3
7.
6
D
G
07
 T
ra
n
sp
o
rt
2.
8
–
1.
4
0.
1
10
.9
–
2.
4
–
0.
6
–
2.
4
1.
3
2.
3
0.
7
1.
4
0.
3
5.
1
2.
3
D
G
08
 D
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t
6.
2
–
1.
0
0.
1
–
–
6.
3
–
1.
9
–
–
–
2.
3
–
0.
6
–
–
–
D
G
09
 P
er
so
n
n
el
-A
d
m
in
is
tr
at
io
n
–
–
0.
5
–
–
–
–
–
0.
6
–
–
–
0.
9
–
0.
5
–
–
–
D
G
10
 In
fo
rm
at
io
n
, C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
, S
o
ci
et
y
–
–
0.
1
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
0.
3
–
–
–
–
–
D
G
11
 E
n
vi
ro
n
m
en
t
9.
0
–
0.
1
–
11
.8
1.
7
4.
0
–
0.
5
–
3.
5
5.
9
3.
6
0.
7
0.
9
0.
1
8.
2
1.
5
D
G
12
 R
es
ea
rc
h
12
.9
–
–
0.
1
–
–
4.
8
2.
4
–
–
–
–
9.
9
2.
3
0.
0
–
–
–
D
G
13
 J
u
st
ic
e 
an
d
 H
o
m
e 
A
ff
ai
rs
1.
1
–
–
–
0.
8
–
2.
4
0.
8
–
–
2.
4
–
1.
3
1.
4
–
–
2.
3
0.
2
D
G
14
 F
is
h
er
ie
s
4.
5
1.
1
8.
7
2.
1
0.
8
–
14
.3
0.
8
5.
8
2.
8
–
–
7.
5
0.
4
7.
6
3.
6
–
–
D
G
15
 In
te
rn
al
 M
ar
ke
t
0.
6
–
–
0.
1
8.
4
0.
8
0.
8
–
–
–
8.
2
2.
4
0.
3
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
7.
2
1.
3
D
G
16
 R
eg
io
n
al
 P
o
lic
y 
an
d
 C
o
h
es
io
n
–
–
0.
8
–
–
–
0.
8
–
0.
3
–
–
–
–
–
–
0.
1
–
–
D
G
17
 E
n
er
g
y
1.
1
–
0.
8
–
–
–
3.
2
–
–
–
–
–
1.
3
–
0.
1
0.
0
1.
9
0.
8
D
G
18
 C
re
d
it
 a
n
d
 In
ve
st
m
en
ts
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
0.
1
–
–
–
–
–
D
G
19
 B
u
d
g
et
1.
7
–
0.
1
–
–
–
–
–
0.
2
–
–
–
0.
9
–
0.
8
0.
0
–
–
D
G
20
 F
in
an
ci
al
 C
o
n
tr
o
l
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
D
G
21
 T
ax
at
io
n
 a
n
d
 C
u
st
o
m
s 
U
n
io
n
–
–
0.
4
–
7.
6
–
2.
4
1.
6
17
.2
0.
5
10
.6
–
7.
2
0.
9
24
.3
0.
7
3.
6
0.
8
D
G
22
 E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 C
u
lt
u
re
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
0.
3
–
–
–
D
G
23
 E
n
te
rp
ri
se
 P
o
lic
y,
 T
o
u
ri
sm
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
0.
4
0.
3
0.
1
–
0.
2
0.
2
König Analysing the Process of EU Legislative Decision-Making 1 5 1
Ta
b
le
 1
(a
)
C
on
tin
ue
d
Pe
ri
od
1/
1/
19
84
 –
 3
1/
12
/1
98
6
1/
1/
19
86
 –
 3
0/
6/
19
87
1/
7/
19
87
 –
 3
1/
10
/1
99
3
Le
ng
th
 o
f p
er
io
d
36
 m
on
th
s
18
 m
on
th
s
76
 m
on
th
s
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
In
st
ru
m
en
t
D
ec
is
io
n
R
eg
ul
at
io
n
D
ir
ec
tiv
e
D
ec
is
io
n
R
eg
ul
at
io
n
D
ir
ec
tiv
e
D
ec
is
io
n
R
eg
ul
at
io
n
D
ir
ec
tiv
e
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
C
ou
nc
il 
di
sc
us
si
on
 it
em
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
D
G
24
 H
ea
lt
h
, C
o
n
su
m
er
 P
ro
te
ct
io
n
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
1.
2
–
0.
6
–
–
–
1.
1
0.
2
D
G
 E
n
la
rg
em
en
t
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
E
u
ro
p
ai
d
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
E
u
ro
st
at
0.
6
–
0.
5
–
–
–
–
–
0.
6
–
2.
4
–
2.
2
0.
1
0.
9
0.
0
1.
5
0.
2
H
u
m
an
it
ar
ia
n
 A
id
 O
ffi
ce
–
–
–
–
4.
2
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
Le
g
al
 S
er
vi
ce
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
0.
2
–
–
–
–
–
0.
2
–
–
–
O
LA
F 
(A
n
ti
-F
ra
u
d
 O
ffi
ce
)
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
S
ec
re
ta
ri
at
-G
en
er
al
0.
6
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
0.
6
0.
4
0.
3
0.
5
–
2.
1
Tr
an
sl
at
io
n
 S
er
vi
ce
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
G
U
D
 (
G
as
 a
n
d
 S
te
am
 E
n
er
g
y)
7.
9
–
27
.1
0.
5
–
–
–
–
0.
3
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
Jo
in
t 
re
se
ar
ch
 c
en
te
r
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
Ta
sk
 F
o
rc
e
1.
7
1.
1
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
1.
3
0.
4
–
–
–
–
S
U
D
–
–
–
–
–
–
2.
4
1.
6
8.
4
0.
6
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
N
o
t 
av
ai
la
b
le
–
–
–
0.
1
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
To
ta
l %
a
91
.7
8.
5
82
.5
17
.3
83
.0
16
.8
89
.1
10
.4
91
.7
8.
1
67
.2
33
.2
86
.5
13
.4
83
.6
16
.1
72
.7
27
.1
R
aw
 t
o
ta
l (
N
)
16
3
15
63
4
13
3
99
20
11
2
14
56
7
50
57
28
60
0
95
18
54
36
2
34
4
12
9
N
ot
es
: R
aw
 s
am
p
le
 t
o
ta
l (
19
84
–2
00
3)
, N
= 
84
75
.
a
M
in
o
r 
d
is
cr
ep
an
ci
es
 a
re
 d
u
e 
to
 r
o
u
n
d
in
g
.
European Union Politics 9(1)1 5 2
Ta
b
le
 1
(b
)
P
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
o
f 
C
o
u
n
ci
l c
o
n
tr
o
ve
rs
ie
s 
b
y 
in
st
ru
m
en
t,
 p
o
lic
y 
ar
ea
 a
n
d
 p
er
io
d
, 1
99
3–
20
03
Pe
ri
od
 s
um
m
ar
iz
ed
1/
11
/1
99
3 
– 
31
/1
2/
19
94
1/
1/
19
95
 –
 3
0/
4/
19
99
1/
5/
19
99
 –
 1
/2
/2
00
3
Le
ng
th
 o
f p
er
io
d
14
 m
on
th
s
52
 m
on
th
s
46
 m
on
th
s
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
In
st
ru
m
en
t
D
ec
is
io
n
R
eg
ul
at
io
n
D
ir
ec
tiv
e
D
ec
is
io
n
R
eg
ul
at
io
n
D
ir
ec
tiv
e
D
ec
is
io
n
R
eg
ul
at
io
n
D
ir
ec
tiv
e
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
C
ou
nc
il 
di
sc
us
si
on
 it
em
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
D
G
01
 T
ra
d
e
14
.3
2.
9
20
.1
2.
2
1.
5
–
8.
9
–
18
.1
0.
1
0.
5
–
14
.3
–
33
.0
0.
5
–
–
D
G
01
A
 E
xt
er
n
al
 R
el
at
io
n
s 
E
u
ro
p
e
2.
9
1.
4
0.
6
–
–
–
14
.0
–
3.
6
0.
1
–
–
8.
2
–
8.
4
1.
6
–
–
D
G
01
B
 E
xt
er
n
al
 R
el
at
io
n
s 
M
id
d
le
 E
as
t
–
–
–
–
–
–
2.
4
0.
2
1.
5
0.
2
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
D
G
02
 E
co
n
o
m
ic
, F
in
an
ci
al
 A
ff
ai
rs
5.
0
–
0.
8
–
–
–
4.
5
0.
2
0.
5
0.
2
–
–
4.
5
0.
5
–
0.
7
–
–
D
G
03
 In
d
u
st
ry
–
–
1.
7
–
16
.4
–
2.
4
–
3.
1
0.
3
11
.4
0.
5
–
–
–
–
–
–
D
G
04
 C
o
m
p
et
it
io
n
0.
7
–
–
–
–
1.
5
0.
4
–
0.
5
0.
3
–
–
0.
2
–
0.
2
–
–
–
D
G
05
 E
m
p
lo
ym
en
t,
 S
o
ci
al
 A
ff
ai
rs
2.
9
2.
1
0.
6
–
3.
0
1.
5
3.
7
0.
4
0.
7
0.
2
6.
2
1.
4
1.
2
1.
4
0.
2
0.
2
2.
2
4.
4
D
G
06
 A
g
ri
cu
lt
u
re
10
.0
1.
4
24
.8
3.
3
13
.4
4.
5
7.
7
0.
6
25
.3
6.
2
16
.2
1.
0
4.
2
0.
2
12
.3
5.
9
–
–
D
G
07
 T
ra
n
sp
o
rt
0.
7
–
1.
7
–
16
.4
–
0.
6
–
1.
1
0.
3
11
.0
1.
9
0.
2
–
–
–
–
–
D
G
08
 D
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t
3.
6
–
0.
6
–
–
–
1.
8
–
1.
3
0.
1
–
–
4.
9
0.
2
0.
7
–
–
–
D
G
09
 P
er
so
n
n
el
-A
d
m
in
is
tr
at
io
n
–
–
1.
1
–
–
–
–
–
1.
6
–
–
–
–
–
1.
8
–
–
–
D
G
10
 In
fo
rm
at
io
n
, C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
, S
o
ci
et
y
1.
4
–
–
–
–
–
1.
6
–
–
–
0.
5
–
0.
5
0.
5
0.
2
0.
2
4.
4
–
D
G
11
 E
n
vi
ro
n
m
en
t
2.
9
1.
4
0.
3
–
7.
5
–
5.
9
0.
4
0.
6
–
7.
6
0.
5
6.
3
0.
9
0.
2
–
10
.0
1.
1
D
G
12
 R
es
ea
rc
h
17
.9
–
–
–
–
–
4.
3
1.
8
0.
1
–
–
–
2.
1
1.
4
–
0.
5
–
–
D
G
13
 J
u
st
ic
e 
an
d
 H
o
m
e 
A
ff
ai
rs
0.
7
–
–
–
3.
0
–
1.
6
0.
2
–
–
4.
3
0.
5
2.
6
1.
2
0.
5
0.
9
3.
3
6.
7
D
G
14
 F
is
h
er
ie
s
9.
3
0.
7
13
.4
7.
2
–
–
8.
9
0.
2
12
.6
7.
7
–
–
6.
1
0.
7
9.
3
2.
5
–
–
D
G
15
 In
te
rn
al
 M
ar
ke
t
4.
3
–
0.
6
–
7.
5
1.
5
1.
6
–
–
–
11
.9
0.
5
0.
5
–
0.
5
0.
7
7.
8
5.
6
D
G
16
 R
eg
io
n
al
 P
o
lic
y 
an
d
 C
o
h
es
io
n
–
–
1.
1
–
–
–
–
–
0.
5
–
–
–
–
–
1.
4
0.
2
–
–
D
G
17
 E
n
er
g
y
2.
1
–
–
–
1.
5
–
3.
5
0.
8
1.
3
–
1.
0
1.
4
2.
3
0.
7
1.
4
1.
4
12
.2
7.
8
D
G
18
 C
re
d
it
 a
n
d
 In
ve
st
m
en
ts
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
D
G
19
 B
u
d
g
et
–
–
0.
8
–
–
–
–
–
0.
4
–
–
–
0.
5
0.
2
0.
2
0.
2
–
–
D
G
20
 F
in
an
ci
al
 C
o
n
tr
o
l
–
–
–
–
–
–
0.
2
–
–
–
–
–
2.
1
0.
2
–
–
–
–
D
G
21
 T
ax
at
io
n
 a
n
d
 C
u
st
o
m
s 
U
n
io
n
6.
4
–
16
.2
0.
3
10
.4
–
13
.6
–
7.
0
0.
7
5.
2
1.
0
10
.0
0.
2
9.
6
–
3.
3
–
D
G
22
 E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 C
u
lt
u
re
0.
7
–
–
–
–
–
1.
4
0.
4
0.
1
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
D
G
23
 E
n
te
rp
ri
se
 P
o
lic
y,
 T
o
u
ri
sm
0.
7
–
–
–
–
–
1.
4
–
–
–
3.
3
–
2.
1
0.
7
1.
8
10
.0
1.
1
König Analysing the Process of EU Legislative Decision-Making 1 5 3
Ta
b
le
 1
(b
)
C
on
tin
ue
d
Pe
ri
od
 s
um
m
ar
iz
ed
1/
11
/1
99
3 
– 
31
/1
2/
19
94
1/
1/
19
95
 –
 3
0/
4/
19
99
1/
5/
19
99
 –
 1
/2
/2
00
3
Le
ng
th
 o
f p
er
io
d
14
 m
on
th
s
52
 m
on
th
s
46
 m
on
th
s
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
In
st
ru
m
en
t
D
ec
is
io
n
R
eg
ul
at
io
n
D
ir
ec
tiv
e
D
ec
is
io
n
R
eg
ul
at
io
n
D
ir
ec
tiv
e
D
ec
is
io
n
R
eg
ul
at
io
n
D
ir
ec
tiv
e
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
C
ou
nc
il 
di
sc
us
si
on
 it
em
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
D
G
24
 H
ea
lt
h
, C
o
n
su
m
er
 P
ro
te
ct
io
n
0.
7
–
–
–
3.
0
–
0.
8
–
–
–
3.
3
1.
4
2.
6
0.
7
0.
5
0.
5
7.
8
6.
7
D
G
 E
n
la
rg
em
en
t
–
–
–
–
–
–
1.
4
–
0.
3
–
–
–
11
.0
–
0.
2
–
–
–
E
u
ro
p
ai
d
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
0.
5
–
–
–
–
–
E
u
ro
st
at
0.
7
–
1.
1
–
1.
5
–
1.
2
–
1.
9
–
1.
4
0.
5
0.
9
–
1.
4
–
1.
1
–
H
u
m
an
it
ar
ia
n
 A
id
 O
ffi
ce
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
0.
1
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
Le
g
al
 S
er
vi
ce
–
–
–
–
6.
0
–
–
–
0.
4
–
5.
7
–
–
–
–
–
3.
3
–
O
LA
F 
(A
n
ti
-F
ra
u
d
 O
ffi
ce
)
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
1.
2
–
–
–
1.
1
–
S
ec
re
ta
ri
at
-G
en
er
al
–
–
0.
6
–
–
–
0.
8
0.
2
0.
5
–
–
–
0.
2
0.
2
–
0.
2
–
–
Tr
an
sl
at
io
n
 S
er
vi
ce
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
0.
1
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
G
U
D
 (
G
as
 a
n
d
 S
te
am
 E
n
er
g
y)
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
Jo
in
t 
re
se
ar
ch
 c
en
te
r
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
0.
2
–
–
–
–
–
Ta
sk
 F
o
rc
e
1.
4
0.
7
0.
6
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
S
U
D
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
N
o
t 
av
ai
la
b
le
–
–
0.
6
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
0.
2
–
–
–
–
–
To
ta
l %
a
89
.3
10
.6
87
.3
13
.0
91
.1
9.
0
94
.6
5.
4
83
.2
16
.4
89
.5
10
.6
89
.6
9.
9
83
.8
16
.2
66
.5
33
.4
R
aw
 t
o
ta
l (
N
)
12
5
15
31
2
47
61
6
48
1
27
80
1
15
9
18
8
22
38
3
43
36
8
71
60
30
N
ot
es
: R
aw
 s
am
p
le
 t
o
ta
l (
19
84
–2
00
3)
, N
= 
84
75
.
a
M
in
o
r 
d
is
cr
ep
an
ci
es
 a
re
 d
u
e 
to
 r
o
u
n
d
in
g
.
regulations and decisions in other periods. This is evidence that using only
directives will provide a biased picture of the legislative process in the EU.
The policy area-specific development is an important characteristic of
European integration history, which had already been documented in Ernst
Haas’ early monographs (1958, 1964). In the literature, several explanations
exist for this area-specific development but, from an institutionalist perspec-
tive, this would require the study of the configuration of member state
preferences. Do member states generally differ in their preference profiles, or
do these preference profiles vary across areas and over time? Regarding this
area-specific effect, we provided a theoretical model in our original analysis
and found a significant impact of the Union’s core domains of agriculture,
common rules, the internal market and trade on the duration of the legis-
lative process (Schulz and König, 2000: 663). Later, the impact of member
states’ area-specific preferences was more rigorously tested and confirmed the
predictions of the original model (König, 2007b). This leads to the second
aspect of my reply to Golub, namely the theoretical contribution made by
each study.
The explanatory variables: History and content
In addition to their common research question, the studies on decision-
making duration also share some independent variables. In principle, the
research designs of all studies are suggestive of the institutionalist school of
thought, which focuses on the impact of institutional variables, such as a
given procedure or voting rule, as well as actors’ preferences, such as the size
of the conflict between the actors involved. Even though the studies differ in
their level of theoretical sophistication, the conventional assumption is that
the size of the core, or the extent of the actors’ mutual conflict, determines
the length of the process by interacting with the particular institutional
settings. This view can be motivated with insights from veto player theory,
which stresses the interaction between the distribution of actors’ preferences
and the particular institutional provisions: the more veto players with diverg-
ing preferences, the less likely is a policy change (Tsebelis, 2002). Note that
further assumptions are necessary for applying veto player theory to the
analysis of process time.2
König and Schulz (1997) and Schulz and König (2000) offer a theoretical
foundation for the derivation of their hypotheses, whereas Golub lists several
relationships, which are sometimes motivated by common wisdom, some-
times related to conventional veto player theory and sometimes a confusing
mix of both. For example, Golub (1999: 743) hypothesizes that ‘formal rules
stipulating majority voting yield faster decision making’, but a subsequent
European Union Politics 9(1)1 5 4
hypothesis states that ‘the underlying distribution of member state prefer-
ences mediates, and potentially negates, the institutional determinants of EC
decision making’ (1999: 746). Furthermore, by expecting that ‘enlargement
slows both majority and unanimous decision making’, it turns out that
Golub’s hypotheses (1999: 744) are based on additional assumptions about
member states’ preferences: only if the magnitude of conflict among member
states increases might one expect slower decision-making, and this clearly
requires careful measurement of the preferences at stake.3
On closer inspection, these studies also differ in the accuracy with which
they operationalize their hypotheses. Golub surprisingly draws conclusions
from events, such as the Luxembourg Compromise (1966), that are outside
the scope of the period under study (1968–98). By using several control vari-
ables for historical time, such as Thatcher or the Greek or other enlargement
rounds, Golub controls for some potential omitted variable bias. However,
whether the change in EU legislative decision-making in 1990 resulted from
the change in the UK government, from German unification or from any other
event cannot be satisfactorily answered by such a research design. A major
drawback of using only control variables can be identified in Golub and
Steunenberg (2007), showing that the institutional variables themselves are
the object of change over time. In other words, why should the application
of QMV have a different impact on EU decision-making process before and
after 1990?
In our original analyses, we had already theorized about the answer and
controlled for policy area. The most recent analysis makes progress by
presenting area-specific estimators for the preferences of the member states,
controlling for interaction effects in the relevant policy areas (König, 2007b).
Using the programmatic positions of member state governments, it is now
possible to identify the relative importance of institutions and preferences for
the process of EU legislative decision-making in a quantitative manner.
Moreover, this analysis refutes another of Golub’s criticisms of other duration
studies, namely their failure to contribute to the discussion of norms. With
regard to the ongoing controversy between constructivists and proponents of
the theory of spatial voting about the converging or diverging effect of
member state positions, the findings reveal that divergence of member state
positions significantly determines the duration of the legislative process,
particularly in the key domains of EU integration: the greater the distance
between the member states’ positions, the longer the EU decision-making
process takes.
Table 2 summarizes the studies on the legislative process by Golub (1999,
2002, 2007), König (2007b), and Schulz & König (2000). All studies find that
qualified majority voting in the Council (QMV, Rule) speeds up decision-
making, and that participation by the European Parliament slows down the
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process (Cooperation, Codecision, Parliament). Note that Schulz and I refrained
from distinguishing between the cooperation and co-decision procedures for
statistical reasons (only about 18% of the cases indicated any parliamentary
participation). Golub almost exclusively uses dummy variables to control for
historical time as defined by periods – such as before and after enlargement,
treaty changes, Thatcher while prime minister and Agenda (coded as 1 for
policy area added by the SEA or Maastricht), whereas Schulz and I controlled
for policy areas as well as for each year in our original study (König and
Schulz, 1997: 9; Schulz & König, 2000: 658, 664). On closer inspection of the
findings on Golub’s control variables, the mixed results suggest that the
conclusions are biased by periodical selection and omitted variables: the sign
of coefficients changes for important variables such as QMV or Thatcher.
Careful analysis of the interaction effects between policy areas and
member state preferences reveals that the magnitude of conflict significantly
affects the decision-making process in the expected direction (König, 2007b).
Except for the area of Common Rules, which is close to zero, member state
conflict slows the pace of legislative decision-making, and the effects for quali-
fied majority voting and parliamentary participation confirm our previous
results. The most recent study also expands the period under study and
painstakingly describes the data-gathering, storing and coding process (for
cross-validation of these data, see König et al., 2006). This guarantees the
reliability of the data and findings, which brings me to the final aspect of my
reply to Golub: the choice of an appropriate statistical model. In Golub’s
(2007) sweeping words, ‘prior studies derive their findings from flawed
methods’.
The method: Tests and testing
A third commonality among all studies is the application of (new) techniques
of event history analysis, which have become a prominent tool for the study
of political processes (for an overview, see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004;
Zorn, 2007). When assessing Golub’s most recent focus on statistical inno-
vation, one has to bear in mind that these studies differ in their data sampling,
theoretical foundations and identification of the model. It is well known that
such differences may have important implications for drawing inferences
from empirical research. Most obviously, Golub’s data include only directives,
whereas our data comprise all binding legislative instruments. Furthermore,
the analyses differ in their period of study and their sample of covariates.
Although Golub (2007) argues for using a specific statistical method and
design, the more general question is whether the tests and findings are deter-
mined by their different samples or by the applied statistical method.4
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Another general (methodological) problem concerns the completeness of
the data; we highly recommend that any user of EU legislative documentation
should report the data-gathering process and discuss the (in)completeness of
the source of information. For example, because CELEX’s official manual
states that data are incomplete prior to 1984, we limited our period of study
to this date, and only cross-validation with different data sources promises a
reduction in problems related to missing data.5 In this respect, Golub (2007:
161) indicates only that ‘extensive use of COM documents and the Official
Journal was essential for the pre-1974 period’. Still, a number of conceptual
decisions are necessary for preparing these data for statistical purposes. For
example, some proposals list more than one reference to the legal basis in the
treaty, which means that it might belong to several policy areas and allow for
the application of different rules (i.e. qualified or unanimous Council voting).
Several proposals can also be collapsed into a single document during the
legislative process, whereas others are split into several legislative acts.
All of these conceptual design choices can affect the composition of the
resulting sample and thus the selection of the appropriate statistical method.
Nevertheless, Golub (2007: 156) generally states that previous research has
‘employed [survival analysis] in methodologically inappropriate ways that
render their conclusions fundamentally suspect’. Two decisions seem to be of
importance to him: the choice of the baseline hazard and the coding of covari-
ates with regard to time dependency. Regarding the choice of the baseline
hazard, Golub (2007: 165) strongly advocates using Cox regression because it
does not restrict the shape of the baseline and allows ‘reliable identification
of proportionality violations and readily accommodates non-proportional
effects of covariates by incorporating time-interactive terms of the sort B*g(t)
where g(t) is some function of survival time (usually ln(t)).’ In my view,
however, the decisive question is whether this approach of including the
interaction with the specific function of time ln(t) remedies a violation of the
proportionality assumption.
For the log-logistic model, Golub (2007: 167) uses the Grambsch/Therneau
test in order to reject the proportionality assumption for his data on directives.
This violation of the proportionality assumption by an application of the log-
logistic model to his data on directives means that a Cox regression is neither
the solution for remedying this effect nor the appropriate model for analysing
the entire set of legislative instruments. Unfortunately, Golub does not present
the statistical proof and adds only the ‘usual’ functional form of duration time
by ln(t) to his analysis, which leaves open the question of whether ln(t) or any
other functional form of g(t) can indeed solve the proportionality problem. The
more general problem concerns the specification of g(t), which needs either
theoretical foundation or empirical evidence. Both are missing in Golub’s
analysis.
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On closer inspection, Golub and Steunenberg (2007) questions almost 
all previous findings by Golub on QMV post SEA, QMV post Maastricht, 
co-decision and cooperation after Maastricht, and Thatcher and backlog
effects. The authors find that using time-interaction variables reveals a more
complicated picture than Golub’s previous analyses suggested: ‘While some
covariates may have a positive impact on the hazard rate at some moment in
time, leading to a speeding-up of decision-making, this impact may change
into a negative one later on. In addition, the combined coefficient for each
covariate is insignificant for some period in time’ (Golub and Steunenberg,
2007: 559). In contrast to Golub (2007), they find that the ‘effects of QMV pre-
and post-SEA are indistinguishable for all values of time’ (2007: 561); ‘the
drag from cooperation overwhelms QMV for the first 8 months (not 12), then
neutralizes it for the next 8 months, but the QMV effect outweighs the co-
operation effect after 16 months’; ‘the unanimity norm is even weaker than
Golub thought, [. . .] the effect of QMV after the Maastricht treaty [. . .] is not
time dependent’ (2007: 562); ‘the effects of cooperation and codecision are
indistinguishable for all values of t’ (2007: 563), ‘a large backlog spurs the
Council to dispose of new proposals but does not expedite passage of the
most controversial pieces of legislation’ (2007: 564), and the Thatcher effect
was slightly less than this and, more interestingly, it reversed direction and
significantly speeded up the adoption of legislation. The authors finally
provide a somewhat curious explanation for one of Golub’s most important
original findings on the Thatcher effect, namely ‘Thatcher’s new views’ on
proposals made after the European Council summit at Fontainebleau in June
1984 (Golub and Steunenberg, 2007: 563).6
This impressionistic account of Thatcher’s preference change and the UK
position – which does not consider the time-dependence change of other
variables over time – and the troubling results of the re-analysis draw atten-
tion to Zorn’s (2007) recommendation on the theoretical foundation for using
time-interaction variables. On closer inspection of the UK position, Figure 2
illustrates the governmental positions of the member states in selected core
areas as well as on the left/right and EU dimensions over time to provide a
more reliable picture on Thatcher’s preference change, two aspects are
relevant here: (i) whether the UK position did change radically in 1984, and
(ii) whether the UK position defines the core of the member states.
The pictures reveal an area-specific development of preferences, accord-
ing to which the UK position significantly changed on the left/right dimen-
sion as well as in the areas of the internal market and agricultural politics
when Margaret Thatcher became prime minister in 1979. However, there is
hardly any significant change in 1984. Clearly, the most drastic change in the
UK position took place in 1997, when Tony Blair entered office. The pictures
European Union Politics 9(1)1 6 0
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also reveal that the UK position does not always define the core of member
states. Even in EU matters, Margaret Thatcher’s government was more
moderate most of the time than the narratives suggested. Except for the
internal market and the left/right dimension, the UK position has rarely been
located at an extreme in trade, common rules or agricultural politics. In
accordance with decision-making theories, we find that these preferences
change over time as a result of national or European events, such as changes
in party government, in the preferences of the political parties themselves or
in the size of EU membership in the course of enlargements.
Conclusion: Pitfalls and challenges in research on the
EU’s legislative process
The study of the EU’s legislative process is a challenging task that creates
certain methodological problems and threatens several pitfalls. These pitfalls
involve data gathering, storage and preparation for the statistical analyses,
the identification and construction of the explanatory variables as well as the
selection of the appropriate statistical method. Perhaps one of the more
general conclusions is that scholars of the legislative process should be less
presumptuous and too convinced that a particular approach is superior to
other scholars’ work. As originally admitted by Golub (1999), our work was
the first to use event history analysis and to perform any sort of diagnostic,
and the overview over the past 10 years of duration analyses has demon-
strated that our conclusions remain consistent. Finally, we invite any scholar
interested in this debate to download the data and run additional analyses to
evaluate the respective claims and findings.7
On closer inspection of studies on the EU’s decision-making process, the
analysis of controversial legislation shows that directives are a particular
instrument that is hardly generalizable to the greater body of EU legislative
decision-making. Furthermore, a quick inspection of the periods under study
reveals that all studies account for institutional reform and enlargement. On
the other hand, it remains an open question whether particular explanatory
variables can account for the hypothesized effects. A dummy variable on the
period during which Margaret Thatcher was UK prime minister can control
only for potentially omitted variables; it is much more labour intensive to
specify and construct indicators that help to test for the presumed effects. In
my view, this is especially important because the non-proportional effects
found in Golub’s analyses could very well be due to an omitted variable bias.
Instead of conducting another analysis on directives, the data-gathering
process needs documentation and the data have to be cross-validated and
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published. For any student of the legislative process it would then be easy to
cross-check the data and to identify conceptual decisions on censoring, double
coding and handling missing values of directives. In recent years, we have
carefully improved our method of extracting information from official data-
bases and provided the reader with the necessary information to improve the
reliability of the procedural data (see König et al., 2006). Furthermore, it has
been possible to construct an indicator for the ‘missing link’ in testing
hypotheses derived from the institutional school of thought, namely the area-
specific preferences of the member states, which vary over time and across
sectors. Nevertheless, such labour-intensive work requires more collaborative
efforts because the preference component has been a major source of error in
previous studies on EU legislative decision-making (Junge and König, 2007).
My hope is that such improvements will not only help scholars to test rival
approaches and understand the factors influencing the decision-making
process, but also motivate them to invest more time in the provision of reliable
data and measures.
Notes
1 For the analysis of process, this poses a methodological problem because
pending initiatives might be censored by the date of the researcher’s data
gathering and thus differ in their likelihood of adoption. In order to cope
with this problem, we decided to limit our sample to those initiatives having
a similar likelihood of adoption, i.e. by excluding those initiatives that remain
pending longer than the median time lag.
2 Although the simple model predicts that the status quo will prevail, member
states favouring policy change have an incentive to win over a blocking
member state or to offer a compromise on another policy issue in return for
the blocking member state’s vote. Side-payments and linkage across issues
and time are strategies to promote policy change that usually demand more
time to resolve differences and to strike a bargain. By contrast, if there is broad
agreement, there is no need for such time-consuming strategies, including
side-payments and package deals, and this should greatly speed up decision-
making (Schulz and König, 2000: 657).
3 Additional assumptions are needed about the expectation of a slowing down
of speed owing to either backlog effects or the expansion of the EC agenda.
4 Quite apart from (in)correctness, Golub’s assumption about the controversial
nature of directives has important ramifications because neither the trend for
directives nor the trend for controversial legislation can be identical with the
trend of the total sample.
5 Comparing the number of directives from cross-validated data sources
suggests that Golub’s 1141 and 1669 cases are a ‘subsample’ of the overall
sample of directives.
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6 Golub and Steunenberg (2007: 563) finally stress a change in Margaret
Thatcher’s preferences in explaining the observed change: ‘Thatcher became
Prime Minister in 1979 and was highly antagonistic for nearly five years until
[. . .] an agreement at the June 1984 European Council summit at
Fontainebleau.’
7 See http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/lehrstuehle/lspol2/main.html. The
data from the Schulz and König analyses can be ordered from
heiner.schulz@sas.upenn.edu.
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